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Abstract: In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as 
philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem 
to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic 
justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At 
least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are 
epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to 
solve it. In the first section, I’ll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I’ll 
provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. 
Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently 
formulated, Goldberg’s arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too 
limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for 
philosophers. 
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1. THE PUZZLE   
Here is the puzzle (Goldberg 2009): 1) Reliability is a necessary 
condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in 
philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some 
philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are 
epistemically justified. The three of these statements cannot be 
simultaneously true, for (1) and (2), together, imply the negation of (3). 
On the other hand, each of them is independently defensible. Let me 
summarize very briefly the reasons available for each point. 
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(1) It seems that in order to be really epistemic, epistemic 
justification has to be somewhat connected to truth. Arguably, 
epistemic justification aims at truth, in the sense that an agent 
cannot be justified if she forms beliefs through a process that 
leads to falsity more often than to truth. I’ll come back to this 
point bellow (§2). 
(2) Since I’ll be concerned with the arguments in favor of 
(2) in §3, I won’t enter into the details here. Let me just advance 
what I take to be the main idea: arguably, in contested 
philosophical matters the diversity of opinions is sufficient to 
conclude either that a) the philosophical method is not a reliable 
one or b) the philosophical method is reliable but diversity 
provides an undercutting defeater that precludes justification. 
(3) We want to say, as philosophers, that at least some 
philosophical theses are epistemically justified. And there is 
some intuitive support for believing this. Take David Lewis as 
an example. He was a very intelligent philosopher; he was 
sufficiently clever, reflexive, free from bias, careful in its 
investigation; he made very serious research regarding some of 
the main problems in philosophy and he was familiar with all, or 
almost all, of the pro and contra arguments available; he thought 
very carefully about those issues, critically examined his own 
positions and received criticisms from the most respected 
philosophical peers through a lot of years. As a result, he arrived 
at some corpus of philosophical beliefs. It seems, prima facie, that 
he was epistemically justified in believing as he did (If he was 
not, what’s left for the rest of us! ). 
Before we tackle the problem in the next sections, there is a 
worry it is necessary to take care of. As it has been suggested by an 
anonymous referee, one might argue that Goldberg’s puzzle doesn’t 
even get off the ground. According to this worry, the puzzle 
equivocates between two different uses of the term ‘justification’ in 
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premise (1) and (3). As the referee points out, there is at least two 
different notions of epistemic justification that have been defended in 
the philosophical literature:  
(a) One is justified only if one is blameless for believing as 
one does.  
(b) One is justified only if one’s belief amounts to 
knowledge, if true.  
According to the objection, premise (1) makes sense only if 
understood in line with (b), while premise (3) should be denied unless it 
is understood in line with (a). If this is right, it seems that we don’t have 
to bother in trying to solve the problem, for there isn’t even a problem 
to start with. 
It is worth noting that Goldberg himself is sensitive to this point. 
In considering the reasons for premise (3) he writes: 
 
The foregoing considerations might fail to convince. After all, nowhere 
in the preceding paragraph did I make a case for the reliability of my 
philosophical beliefs. Granted. But consider the cost that must be 
borne by anyone who denies that at least some of my philosophical 
beliefs are justified. In that case one must hold that a subject who is 
normally functioning, reasonably intelligent, hard-working, careful, 
suitably educated and experienced, who has access to and avails himself 
of the relevant evidence, and who gives careful consideration of 
relevant considerations to the contrary, nevertheless systematically fails 
to arrive at justified belief in the domain in question. This, I submit, is a 
curious result: where justified belief is possible, we might be forgiven 
for thinking that it is just such a person who will attain it. What sort of 
shady activity is philosophy anyway, that it attracts reasonably 
intelligent people into spending their intellectual lives toiling away, only 
to be systematically thwarted in their efforts at justified belief?  (We 
don’t need an evil demon; philosophy itself is the culprit.) (Goldberg 
2009, p. 111) 
 
Admittedly, then, Goldberg does not present positive reasons for 
reading premise (3) in line with (b). But, as I read it, in the quoted 
passage he is making the case that being unable to interpret premise (3) 
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in line with (b) comes at a high price: we are left with a perplexity, that 
is, that a normally-function, intelligent and careful individual, with 
access to all the relevant evidence, would not have knowledge, even if 
her belief happens to be true. So you might read (3) in line with (a), but 
that is not less problematic. To be sure, denying that philosophers 
possess, regarding contested philosophical matters, the kind of 
justification that turns true beliefs into knowledge amounts to a 
relevantly strong form of philosophical skepticism, provided that there 
is widespread disagreement about almost all important philosophical 
topics (that is, disagreement is almost ubiquitous in philosophy). 
Philosophical skepticism is something we would like to avoid if 
possible. So dismissing the problem by invoking an equivocation in the 
uses of the term ‘justification’ is one option, but it’s not unproblematic 
at all.  
Now, even if one buys that premise (3) cannot be plausibly 
understood in terms of (b), I’ll argue, the puzzle is still pressing. Of 
course, I ultimately agree with the referee in that Goldberg’s puzzle is 
only apparently problematic. I contend, however, that it is a puzzle 
worth considering, for premises (1) and (2) provide prima facie reasons 
for believing that philosophers are not epistemically justified, even in 
sense (a), when it comes to philosophical contested matters.  
Any philosopher that accepts (1) and (2) cannot say that she is 
epistemically justified, even in sense (a), about some particular contested 
philosophical matter. If you accept that reliability is a necessary 
condition for epistemic justification and you are aware that your belief 
concerns a contested philosophical matter (and proviso the truth of (2), 
that is, that your belief concerning that matter was not reliably formed), 
then it seems that you are to blame for believing as you do. Being aware 
of (1) and (2) seems to preclude epistemic justification, even in the 
sense of (a), about contested philosophical matters. So, were a 
philosopher to accept (1) and (2), she would be blameworthy if she 
holds her belief in the face of controversy. Again, given that 
A PUZZLE FOR PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 36, n. 2, p. 215-228, jul.-dez. 2013. 
219 
controversy is ubiquitous within philosophy, this is a worrying 
consequence. 
Another reason for maintaining that the puzzle is compelling 
even in light of the previous considerations to the contrary can be 
found in Goldberg’s paper. As we’ll see in detail in section §3, 
Goldberg provides an argument (The Undercutting Defeater 
Argument) that attempts to show that the fact of widespread 
disagreement about some philosophical matter provides an 
undercutting defeater that precludes justification, even if one’s belief was 
reliably formed. So, according to Goldberg, even if we grant that a 
philosopher is reliable in forming philosophical beliefs about contested 
philosophical matters, in the face of controversy she is to be 
epistemically blamed for believing as she does, for she is ignoring the 
undercutting defeater provided by the fact of disagreement. This is a 
consequence sufficiently uneasy to hold, for one would want to say 
that, at least in some cases, one has justification in sense (a) even in the 
face of controversy.  
So, I believe there are reasons to maintain that the puzzle is prima 
facie worrying. In the next two sections I will attempt to provide a 
solution to these problems. In section (§2), I’ll argue that there are 
some general worries that cast doubts concerning the legitimacy of the 
puzzle. My point is that the three premises cannot be jointly justifiably 
believed, and that that is a minimum requisite for the puzzle to be 
compelling. If I am correct, thus, we need not embrace philosophical 
skepticism just in order to solve the puzzle. In section (§3), I will argue 
that, even ignoring the general problems raised in section §2, the 
arguments provided by Goldberg in support of (2) are not compelling: 
once we take into account the possibility of different epistemic 
perspectives, those arguments lose their original appeal. 
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2. JUSTIFICATION, RELIABILITY AND TRUTH 
If (2) is true, philosophers don’t have at their disposal a reliable 
method for forming philosophical beliefs regarding contested matters. 
So, if reliability is thought of as a necessary condition for justification–
(1)–, philosophical theses about contested matters are not justified–(3) 
is false–. But that is a very pessimistic conclusion, one that we would 
like to avoid if possible. Moreover, intuitively, we would say that at least 
some philosophers have epistemic justification for at least some of their 
philosophical beliefs (even on contested matters). 
Now, I think that the first statement of the puzzle is very 
problematic. In fact, there is no consensus regarding (1). Not every 
philosopher would agree in that reliability is a necessary condition for 
epistemic justification. A quick look into the literature shows this point. 
There are philosophers that reject the idea that reliability is a necessary 
condition for justification; moreover, there are philosophers that go 
even further, rejecting the idea that justification is truth-aimed. Here is 
just an example from Cruz&Pollock: 
 
We conclude from this that a truth-aimed externalist epistemology is 
not entitled to carry the day solely on the allegation that it is intrinsic to 
beliefs or the processes of belief formation that they must aim at truth. 
Instead, the right picture in our view involves truth being a person’s 
aim (at least some of the time), while beliefs are formed through 
epistemic norms that only answer to themselves as evaluative 
standards.(Cruz&Pollock 2004, pp. 24)  
 
It should be clear that it is a contested matter whether reliability 
is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. If that is so, the first 
horn of the puzzle loses it’s primary appeal. But the problem I want to 
point out is not just that many philosophers actually reject (1). The 
problem is that, as long as it is a contested matter in philosophy 
whether reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification 
(and a quick look into the literature shows that it is) it can be said, if 
one takes point (2) seriously, that it was not reliably formed, and thus, 
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that one is not epistemically justified in affirming it. The point is this: 
assuming I justifiably believe (2), then I have reasons to believe that I 
do not have a reliable method of forming beliefs about contested 
matters in philosophy. But I am a philosopher and the question of 
whether reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification is 
a contested matter in philosophy. Thus, if I am justified in in believing 
(2), I am not justified in believing (1). Of course, the point applies to 
any philosopher: if one is justified in believing (2), one cannot be 
justified in believing (1), as long as it is a contested philosophical 
matter. 
It could be said that this is no surprise. It is precisely Goldberg’s 
aim to emphasize that there are three claims that are independently 
plausible but that cannot be simultaneously true. Thus, what I just said in 
the previous paragraph would only prove that Goldberg was right. I 
don’t think that that is the case. First of all, one could run the same 
argument above in order to prove that (2) alone cannot be rationally 
believed: if Goldberg’s arguments regarding (2) are successful, then (2) 
itself could be deemed as unreliably formed, for it is plausible to say 
that (2) is a contested philosophical thesis –In fact, I believe Goldberg’s 
arguments supporting (2) are not compelling, as I’ll argue in the next 
section (§3). Thus, given that it is a contested philosophical matter itself 
, (2) is a self undermining premise (at least for any philosopher). Thus, 
there is no way in which a philosopher could be justified in believing 
(2), as long as it is a contested philosophical matter. That’s enough to 
disentangle Goldberg’s puzzle, for it seems that (2) is not defensible 
even independently assessed. But let me ignore that problem for the 
moment. Note that what I am saying is not trivially entailed by 
Goldberg’s claim that (1), (2) and (3) cannot be simultaneously true. My 
point was not that (1) and (2) cannot be simultaneously true, for they 
actually can. What I am arguing is that they cannot be jointly rationally 
believed. The general point I want to make is that although Goldberg’s 
puzzle says that (1), (2) and (3) cannot be simultaneously true, it is 
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needed, in order for the puzzle to be compelling, or to have any interest 
for philosophers, that they could at least be jointly rationally believed 
by a philosopher. If one takes (2) seriously (and given that (1) is a 
philosophical contested matter), one has at least to suspend judgment 
about (1), for (2) provides evidence that (1) was not reliably formed. 
Thus, although one could continue believing (1), wouldn’t be justified 
in doing so. Thus, even if (1) and (2) were true, one could never be 
justified in believing both of them. My point could therefore be stated 
as follows: (2) constitutes an Undercutting Defeater for (1), (3) and for 
itself –it provides evidence that undermines the evidential connection 
between the rest of the evidence and the other premises. Thus, there is 
no way of justifiably believing (2), or the combination of (2) with either 
(1), (3) or both.  
There is a final worry concerning the puzzle. Justification and 
reliability are philosophical notions (they were created by 
philosophers).Thus, asking whether philosophy possesses a reliable 
method or produces justified claims, is equivalent to asking philosophy 
to assess itself from an epistemic point of view. The question consists, 
thus, in whether philosophy can meet their own epistemic standards or 
not. And that leads to a very strange situation: on the one hand, if 
philosophy cannot meet those standards, it means that it is 
epistemically flawed. But in that case is not even clear the standards 
themselves were legitimate in the first place (for they were formulated 
within a discipline under epistemic suspicion, so to say). So, we cannot 
learn any lesson from this first situation. On the other hand, if 
philosophy actually meets its own epistemic standards, the situation is 
not very illuminating either. We cannot conclude, for example, that 
philosophers’ theses are epistemically well supported, for supposing 
that would amount to presuppose already that the self-imposed 
requisites were legitimate, that is, that the notions of justification and 
reliability are not epistemically flawed. The general point is that there 
seems to be something problematic with asking a method (in this case a 
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philosophical method) to assess its own epistemic credentials. 
Therefore, philosophy is not worse in that respect than other 
disciplines of which we do not hold a skeptic attitude.  
The previous arguments show that it’s not at all clear that 
Goldberg’s puzzle is a legitimate one. In the next section I’ll argue that 
even ignoring those problems, Goldberg’s arguments supporting (2) 
can be undermined once the importance of the philosopher’s epistemic 
perspective is taken into account.  
 
3. PHILOSOPHICAL DIVERSITY 
In this section I’ll examine some arguments in support of point 
(2). I will claim that once the philosopher’s epistemic perspective is 
taken into account, those arguments lose their initial appeal. My main 
point is that, as long as it is possible to tell a different story about 
philosophical diversity, the thesis of philosophers’ unreliability is not 
forced upon us.  
I will assess three arguments in favor of the unreliability of 
philosophical methods on contested matters: The unreliable method 
argument, The dangerous context argument and The undercutting defeater 
argument. Let me begin with The unreliable method argument. This argument 
goes as follows: imagine a contested matter in which the parties use the 
same method. In that case, the fact of diversity of opinions undermines 
the idea that the method in question is a reliable one, for it cannot be 
the case that it produces a preponderance of true beliefs. If the method 
is shared and, as used by different people, it produces incompatible 
beliefs, it cannot be a reliable one.  
The first thing to notice is that even if the argument were 
correct, it wouldn’t be so bad. First of all, it only covers cases of 
philosophical disagreement where the belief-forming method is shared. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to think that a lot of philosophical 
disagreements (maybe the most interesting and persistent ones) emerge 
because of the diversity of philosophical methods. Secondly, the 
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argument only shows that a method is unreliable regarding some topic 
(the topic applied to which it produces a diversity of opinion), but it 
does not show that it’s not reliable regarding all the other philosophical 
topics where its application doesn’t produce a diversity of opinion. 
Thirdly, it only covers disagreements where the diversity of opinion is 
not due to an error on the part of one of the philosophers involved 
(that is, cases in which the method is reliable but one of the parties 
applied it incorrectly). Thus, even granting that the argument is sound, 
the scope of its conclusion is rather limited: philosophers’ 
disagreement, as long as they share the method and it is not the case 
that the disagreement is due to a performance error on the part of one 
of them, shows that the method they are using is not reliable regarding 
the topic under discussion. To be sure, that is not a terrible 
consequence unless it is shown that the described situation is 
sufficiently common within philosophy. I don’t think it is. In any case, 
the burden of proof is here on my opponent’s side. 
That being said, the argument has a problem that is pointed out 
by Goldberg himself: it assumes that there are specifically philosophical 
methods. For someone not willing to accept that, the argument has no 
dialectical force. Goldberg is aware of that, and presents a different 
kind of argument that doesn’t need to assume specifically philosophical 
methods: The dangerous context argument. The dangerous context argument 
presuppose that the methods used by philosophers within philosophical 
contexts are the same they use in other contexts. But even if those 
methods are generally reliable, philosophical diversity creates a 
dangerous context, analogous to a context of poor lightening with 
respect to vision. Dangerous contexts turn otherwise reliable methods 
into unreliable ones. It is important to note though (and Goldberg 
himself is aware of this), that insofar as it is possible to explain diversity 
of opinions in a different way, The dangerous context argument is not forced 
upon us. 
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Now, I believe that such explanation can be provided. I have 
defended elsewhere (Lo Guercio 2012) that we must distinguish two 
different kinds of philosophical disagreements, depending on to what 
extent the epistemic perspective of the parties is shared. In that article, I 
labeled Weak Disagreements those where the epistemic perspective is 
widely shared, and Strong Disagreements those where the parties’ 
epistemic perspectives relevantly differ. An epistemic perspective 
includes a conception of what facts count as evidence, the relative 
weight assigned to different kinds of evidence and what epistemic goals 
are more relevant, i.e. a number of normative and methodological 
commitments. Different epistemic perspectives may determine 
differences with respect to all those issues. The insight behind these 
definitions is that usual accounts of disagreement fail to acknowledge a 
very important feature of the notion of evidence: being evidence is not 
a straightforwardly factual property, but a property that a proposition 
has only relative to some system of epistemic norms, policies, goals, 
and methodological commitments. That is, ‘evidence’ is an implicitly 
relative notion: what things count as evidence and to which extent they 
support some belief (or degree of confidence in some belief) depends, 
at least in part, on an epistemic perspective. Back then, I argued that 
philosophers frequently disagree about their epistemic perspectives 
(sometimes, the disagreement is implicit); that is, about the facts they 
consider evidence, the relative weight and relevance of that evidence, 
and the epistemic goals that are priority (apart from truth: empirical 
adequacy, coherence, explanatory power, among others). Examples of 
this are the discussions about the evidential role of intuitions, the role 
of semantic competence in philosophical research, the weight assigned 
to thought experiments, etc. All philosophers take implicit or explicit 
commitments regarding what I’ve called an epistemic perspective. The 
difference between epistemic perspectives, together with the idea that 
numerous philosophical disagreements between parties with a shared 
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epistemic perspective might be due to performance errors, can explain 
to a great extent the fact of the diversity of philosophical opinions. 
Now, how this fact bears on the discussion about the reliability 
of philosophical methods?  Well, as Goldberg himself claims, as long as 
the diversity of opinion can be explained appealing to differences in 
epistemic perspective, there is no need to conclude that philosophy is a 
“dangerous context”, similar to poor lightening in the case of vision. 
Different perspectives determine different access to the relevant 
evidence in the sense that include some commitments (implicit or 
explicit) regarding what facts count as evidence and what evidence is 
more relevant. If that’s right, we need not jump from the fact of 
diversity to the conclusion that philosophers form their beliefs 
regarding contested matters through unreliable methods. 
What about The undercutting defeater argument?  This argument 
states that the fact of diversity of opinions regarding some 
philosophical issue constitutes an undercutting defeater for my own 
belief. Even if it is granted that I used a reliable method, the evidence 
provided by diversity diminishes the subjective probability that my 
belief is true. So, even if I relied on a reliable method, I’m not justified, 
for I have reasons to believe that the method was not reliable. The 
conclusion is that, regarding contested matters in philosophy, 
philosophers are not justified, even if they formed their beliefs through 
a reliable method. 
Now, an undercutting defeater is evidence that undermines the 
evidential connection between some other piece of evidence and the 
relevant belief. But diversity can only constitute an undercutting 
defeater if the other shares to some relevant extent my epistemic 
perspective, that is, The undercutting defeater argument only works for cases 
of weak peer disagreement. If my rival shares my epistemic perspective, 
I’m sure he has a method at least as reliable as mine. Thus, diversity of 
opinions serves as an undercutting defeater. But if my opponent has a 
rather different epistemic perspective, the disagreement might be 
A PUZZLE FOR PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 36, n. 2, p. 215-228, jul.-dez. 2013. 
227 
explain just by that fact. Therefore, I have no reason to take the 
disagreement as an indicator that my belief might be false. I believe, 
though, that the most relevant, interesting and persistent discussions 
among philosophers are cases of strong disagreement, that is, 
disagreement between philosophers with different methodological 
conceptions, different ideas about what facts constitutes philosophical 
evidence or what epistemic goals are relevant, etc. Thus, as long as the 
scope of the argument only reaches cases of weak disagreement, the 
situation is not so bad after all. Or, in any case, an argument is needed 
(or several examples) that most persistent philosophical disagreements 
are carried between philosophers (or group of philosophers) deploying 
relevantly similar philosophical perspectives.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I attempted to resolve a puzzle that challenges us 
all as philosophers. I argued that the puzzle’s legitimacy is dubious for 
several reasons. First of all, it is not only the case that their premises 
cannot be simultaneously true, but they cannot be jointly rationally 
believed by a philosopher. If this is correct, the problem loses its 
primary appeal: if the puzzle is to be a serious problem, it should be 
possible at least to rationally believe their premises. The second reason 
to doubt the legitimacy of the puzzle has to do with the known 
problems that emerge from asking a method to asses its own epistemic 
credentials. It is not clear that a method, in order to be justified or to 
produce justified beliefs, should be able to assess itself positively from 
an epistemic point of view; or, in any case, the problem is not specific 
of philosophy. 
On the other hand, I argued that even ignoring the issues above 
mentioned, one can deny that there is a real problem, on the grounds 
that premise (2) has not been properly argued for. I assessed the three 
arguments provided by Goldberg in favor of (2) and showed them 
wanting: concerning both The unreliable method argument and The 
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undercutting defeater argument, I pointed out the limited scope of their 
conclusion, which makes them innocuous. As to the The dangerous context 
argument, I showed that a different story regarding philosophical 
diversity could be provided, making the argument lose its primary 
appeal. 
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